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In this paper I will try to examine the crossing points between 
individualism and political theory. Within this wide and complex area, three 
main issues will be dealt with:
1) Ihe first concerns individualism, as a method of inquiry in the social 
sciences, and its applications in political philosophy. Broadly speaking, 
methodological individualism assumes individuals as the basic units of 
socihl life and therefore, tries to explain all social phenomena in terms of 
the individual agent. Ihe applications of the method in political theory 
provide a picture of the political realm with reference to individuals' aims 
and interests, and provide models of the just society as the result of the 
individual choice.
2) Ihe second issue concerns those forms of political arrangements which 
are compatible with, and which therefore entail individualism. In this 
respect, individualism does not irrply a method of theory construction, but 
rather an ideal, a set of values orientating a conceptual framework of 
the social world. Political models may encompass individualism in three 
different ways:, a) justification of political obligation; b) the conception 
of individuals as free actors in the political realm; c) as a consequence of 
(b), collective participation in political decision making.
3) Ihen I intend to deal with the problematic definition of public 
interest, when it is viewed from the individualist approaches. That is to 
say, what individualism demands of politics. I will show that this is a 
specific issue arisen in connection with individualism, which it does not 



























































































-  2 -
This third problem inplies both the assumption of an individualistic 
Weltanshauung and the use of some sort of methodological individualism to 
reach a solution.
Clearly, dealing with political models, the two aspects of 
individualism, as an ideal and as a method are very often strictly related, 
since values such as autonony, human dignity, privacy are normally embedded 
in political theories built on some versions of methodological individualism 
and viceversa. Still there are many exceptions: one well known exanple is 
Thomas Hobbes' conception which begins with the methodological assumption of 
free and equal individuals and ends up with a strong, absolute state, with 
no individual guarantees.
But, leaving aside the exceptions, the links between methodological 
individualism and individualistic values exhibits many difficulties as the 
analysis of public interest will try to point out.
Before taking up the topic, I want to clarify that the strategy of 
inquiry- used here is the analytical method of conceptual models. Though 
references will often be made to history, history of ideas, and classical 
thought, I will use these references as materials to build ideal-types, 
throu^i which political and social life will be represented. I do not 
therefore fore attempt to reconstruct the developments and the changes of 
concepts, let alone examining political formations as historical data.
What I would like to do is to stress some theoretical problems 
concerning logical consistency in political theory involving individualism 
and viceversa. And, since descriptions of the social and political sphere 
affect our behaviour and so influence the social costruction of the world, 
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1. METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AID POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE CASES OF 
HVISIBLE HAT© VERSUS SOCIAL CONTRACT.
In this first part, I shall begin with a brief sketch of philosophical 
and epistemological features involved in methodological individual ism. Then 
I shall focus on the two rival conceptual schemes in which the method is 
applied in political philosophy, namely the so-called "invisible hand" 
mechanism and the model of social contract. In order to do this, a brief 
presentation shall be given of what, to rry knowledge, is the most extreme 
example of the invisible hand approach within contemporary philosophy, that 
suggested by Friedrich von Hayek; the analysis of Hayek's position will 
allow me to outline, by contrast, the opposite approach.
A purely epistemological definition of individualism can be found in 
the debate which developed in England in the Fifties and the Sixties, 
against holism(2). By holism we mean the viewpoint which assumes social 
facts to be more than a mere sum of individual components.
Briefly, methodological individualism includes: a) ontological 
assumption about individuals as the only empirical agents in social life 
and, thus, the denial of the existence of social vrtmoles; b) epistemological 
principles about the form of explanation in social sciences.
It should be noticed, however, that the consideration of individuals 
does not concern itself with individuality, by which is meant the unique 
character of each human being. The individual here is indeed considered as 
an abstract entity, with given features representing the commonality of 



























































































-  4  -
than individuals, insofar as they are playing their role only as 
representative individuals. This is indeed one of the criticisms against 
methodological individualism. Nevertheless, this remark does not affect the 
theory whose aim is not a moral affirmation of the single human being, but a 
better understanding of social phenomena by means of this heuristic device 
of the abstract individual. In this sense individuals are seen as much as in 
the same way as atoms in chemistry, as the smallest and sinplest component 
of social world, regardless of the personality involved(3).
Among various versions of this methodological approach, a distinction 
should be made between descriptive, definitional individualism, and 
explanatory individualism.
The latter implies the reduction of all explanations in social sciences 
to theories which make use only of Individual predicates, i.e., every social 
explanation is framed in terms of individual actions while the possibility 
of non-reducible emergencies as the outcome of interactions is rejected.
Without getting into the details of this discussion, it should be 
pointed out that, in order to make a reduction, two theories are needed, 
one reducible to another, larger and more fundamental one; and both must be 
closed and complete, that is specified in all their variables and in the 
relations among call the variables. This is quite far from the present 
situation in social sciences, apart from the whole question concerning the 
legitimacy of reduction itself. Moreover a set of combination rules is 
required in order to explain the compositional effect: but the validity of 
combination rules cannot be accepted a priori,being a matter of empirical 
demonstration (4).
Definitional individualism (the weak version), on the contrary, states 
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reduced to individual agents. According to this all collective concepts 
have no existence of their own, outside social actions and interactions, and 
their reduction, even if possible, would be too long and complicated and 
useless for analytical purposes. Therefore some form of 'emergence', i.e. 
properties of phenomena which would be unexpected on the basis of their 
corrponent elements, are compatible with individualism. The theme of 
'unintended consequences' should be placed here, as filling the space 
between individual actions and the social outcome(5).
Approaching methodological individualism in terms of theory 
construction, another distinction we can draw among theories built according 
to an intentional action approach and those built according to the general 
model of behaviorism(6). Quite apart from the epistemological problem 
concerning reduction and emergence, the issue has to do with different 
models of human beings and contrasting views of human behaviour(7).
For behavourism, human action is in fact explained without any 
reference to the actor's intentions and motivations, simply as a response to 
a given stimulus while the intentional action paradign conceives of 
individuals as acting purposefully, choosing under constraints, but 
nevertheless among several alternatives. This implies a model of human 
being which is able to conceive of ends, to project possible courses of 
action, to weigfr them up and to choose the best, according to the actor's 
preferences, beliefs, abilities, expectations of others' behaviour. The 
intentional model does not necessarily mean that individuals are actually 
able to maximise their freely chosen goals, but that individual actions, no 



























































































-  6 -
results may or may not correspond to expectations, are intentionally 
oriented towards purposes.
It must be added that the two paradigms, clearly contrasting in 
theoretical terms, are not easily distinguisable in their application, that 
is when one comes to social explanations.
Without going into details the rational choice model, for example, 
which is the main development of the intentional action paradign, does not 
allow us to appreciate the difference between an intentional action and a
fully determined one, at least, given the standard definition of
*
rationality.
In other words, in economics or in political science, in order to make 
use of the rational choice model, the actor1 s goals are normally 
postulated, for example, optimal allocation of resources, profit
maximization or the quest for seeking offices, etc. Now when actors'goals 
are given, individuals find themselves trapped between constraints, 
circumstances and goals, so that if they are rational, only one course of 
action is open to them. This being the case, nothing enables the observer 
to detect whether the action was intentionally orientated towards purposes 
or simply adaptive to the external situation. Ihus the rational choice 
model becomes a sort of behaviourism, where actors' intentions are indeed 
disappeared(8). Paradoxically, the only kind of actions which allow the 
inference of intent ionality is the irrational one or the mistake. 
(However, this higly theoretical problem does not affect -or not too much- 
the work both of economists and of political scientists, who, after all, are 
not conmitted to a philosophically sound definition of human nature, but, 
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specific fields, regardless of whether behaviour presupposes intentions or 
whether it actually correspond to a stimulus-response scheme).
So too in the realm of political philosophy the above question does not 
particularly undermine the theory, because the relevant use of 
methodological individualism is limited to the intentional action model. 
This is obvious, because if one thinks of human beings as completely 
plastic, no possibility is left for a normative theory of politics.
In this field, the two rival models which I intend to refer to, are 
social contract and invisible hand theories. The main argument concerns the 
possibility and the desirability of collective choice, leaving aside the 
question of how a collective decision can be brought about by rational 
individuals.
I shall start from a picture of the invisible hand model by means of a 
presentation of Hayek's political philosophy, and then I shall return to the
debate.
The kind of methodological individualism which underlies the economics 
and social philosophy of Friedrich von Hayek is not concerned with 
reductionism, which is the strong version of individualism. Rather his 
methodological approach can be reconstructed on the basis of a negative 
assumption: in Hayek's view, the starting point of social science analysis 
should be the individual only because of his/her enpirical evidence and also 
because of the impossibility of visualizing any social whole independently 



























































































-  8  -
mean that social outcome should be considered as intentional products of a 
human design which individual actor can easily master(9).
This can be explained by going back to the model of human beings which 
lies behind Hayek's programme. Again Hayek uses a sort of 'negative' 
approach to the issue, according to which we can scarcely define the 
positive potentialities of rationality, but, we can however recognize its 
limited extention, from everyday experience. Vhile the totality of human 
knowledge distributed throughout society amounts to a large, powerful 
aggregate, the part of it that each individual attains is small, so that 
human beings can control only the immediate consequences and effects of 
their own actions in the limited sphere they know(10).
This notion of the individuals' ontological ignorance constitutes the 
basic idea, not only of Hayek's philosophy and methodology, but also of his 
political position. Mainly from the model of limited rationality, Hayek 
derives a criticism of social planning and of any form of collective control 
of social facts. He supports the theory of society as the unintended and 
unplanned product, of spontaneous social coordination.
(I would like just to remark that the idea of limited rationality-e.g. in 
the more famous version of Herbert Simon's bound rationality-(11)does not 
necessarily bring about the denial of social planning. Cn the contrary, in 
the case of Simom, the acknowledgment of human rationality' s limits becomes 
the ground for a theory of organization).
The concepts of limited rationality and its opposite, that of 
omniscience are embedded in two different traditions in Western 
philosophy(12). The first is continental rationalism which, starting with 
Descartes assumes human capability of rational control both in individual 



























































































-  9 -
of human nature in less flattering terms: since human beings are 
ontologically limited they cannot control reality, but can only adapt to it. 
Thus society is conceived of as the result of a spontaneous evolution and 
growth, with an unplanned emergence of patterns and social rules. This 
anticostructivistic view, which makes claim for a slow and unintentional 
evolution of society in an unknown direction was traditionally embodied in 
organicism, with its ideas about natural and uncontrolled phases of 
development and about hierarchically organized parts; the organism can be 
cured in the case of illness, but cannot be consciously designed. This 
powerful idea, deeply rooted in Western political philosophy is generally 
connected with a holistic point of view; is politically oriented against 
innovation; and is in favour of tradition. Not by chance, indeed, this 
organicistic theory of society flourished in the early XIX 
century (classicaly eserrplified by Hegelian philosophy) in relation to the 
"abstract', "artificial" attempt of the French Revolution to build a new 
social order.
The traditional thought to which Hayek refers and to which he claims to 
belong peculiarly combines an individualistic approach with an organicistic 
evolutionary view of society. In fact, inside this composite stream of 
thought unified by Hayek under the label of "true individualism" different 
components are present. In Hayek's work, the English philosophy of Hume, 
Mandeville and Smith is filtered, through Burke's traditionalism into the 
German historical school of jurisprudence (Humboldt, Hugo, Savigny). 
These different streams have already found a syntesis in Carl Menger's 
methodology of social science, the founding programme of the Austrian school 
of Economics(13). In this way, Hayek does actually revisit Menger's 




























































































The invisible hand mechanism, in fact, is applied not only to a 
horizontal situation as in the case of the market, as in Smith's original 
version, but also it implies that individuals pursue stable advantages only 
if their interests can combine with others' plans. Given human ignorance, 
single actors cannot plausibly pursue social coordination as an end, nor set 
an agreement in order to produce it. Between individual intentional actions 
and the outcome there is neither a conscious design nor an irrational 
development: indeed there is a trial and error process through which the 
most successful patterns are selected and fixed in istitutions. Cnee they 
are set up, institutions "become" data available to the actors of the 
following generations, both as constraints and as sources of informations: a 
network of stable expectations is thus established within which only 
rational action may be performed. This model exhibit a family resemblance to 
natural evolution: like the latter, the process shows a sort of a-posteriori 
rationality that is, something like unintentional teleology, since no human 
mind has designed the outcome(14).
V ... v .• . ' . ,
As an explanation of socio-political life, the invisible hand mechanism 
is considered fundamental, because the explanans makes use of completely 
different terms than does the explanandum. According to Robert Nozick "the 
less an explanation uses notions constituting what is to be explained, the 
more (coeteris paribus) we understand"(15).
Thus, no altruistic or sociable attitude is assumed, such as described 
in Aristotle's definition of the political animal, nor is the actors' 
consciousness of higher conmon good as in Rousseau's volonte generale. 
Through the invisible hand, social order comes into existence only as a by­




























































































This however is true only if one considers the exchange of goods 
between two producers as the basic unit of social life. Wenger was the 
first to point out that market transactions appear as a fair situation 
because each actor pursuing his/her interest, satisfies also the other's and 
so, unintentionally, a corrmon good is brought about (16). But two 
requirements must be met if one wants to extend the model to all aspects of 
social life: l)the situation of the actors must be, more or less, equal. In 
the case of great differences -clear advantages and handicaps- direct 
inposition would plausibly be the rule of selfish actors. 2)lndividual 
interests must be open to transactions (no lexicographic value is allowed).
I think that this very image of society emerging from the exchange of 
goods, gives roots to the deep motivation of Hayek's denial of a 
constructivistic approach.
We have seen Hayek's criticism of social construction and public 
choice because human beings are only limitedly capable of foresight. But it 
should be observed that human limitations may explain the difficulties and 
limits caused by models of socio-political engeneering (namely, side- 
products and perverse effects), but they cannot provide adequate support for 
the invisible hand model. In order to clarify this point, I shall refer to 
social contract theories. The need for a social contract has always been 
founded in the impossibility of a spontaneous growth of stable cooperation. 
The very image of the state of nature, however defined, points out to a pre­
social situation where conflicts, unsecurity and arbitrariness are (or may 
easily become) dominant.
Thus, it is considered necessary to overcome this original stage for 
peace f\jl life to be set up through an enforced agreement (which individuals 




























































































contract derives much more from the need to solve conflicts than from a bias 
for rational construction of. reality. But Hayek's assumption of limited 
rationality does not answer the problem of war and insecurity symbolized by 
the state of nature. In fact, besides human ignorance, Hayek makes another 
irrplicit assumption; that is , that the basic interactions of a social life 
take the form of a cooperation game. Now, if the basic interaction is 
cooperative, why should any social cotract be required? Social contract, 
even before being considered difficult, expensive and dangerous, appears to 
be useless. This is the first point I want to make about the two models: on 
the one hand, they imply different concepts of human nature, a more 
"optimistic" one in the case of social contract, and a quite "pessimistic" 
one in the case of invisible hand, where individual rationality is not 
considered capable to go further than individual plans, and even then, to a 
limited extent, that is, only vdthin a given context of known rules and 
expectations. On the other hand, they also refer to a rival pictures 
of basic human interaction, and here we can say, a "pessimistic' one in the 
social contract model (conflict, unsecurity) and an "optimistic" one in the 
opposite model (possible transactions of interests).
Another issue should be brought up at this point for the comparison of 
the two models. Like the social contract, the invisible hand has both an 
explanatory value and a normative significance as a justification scheme for 
social arrangements. But here I think that the two models exhibit an 




























































































-  13  -
At the explanatory level, both models carry the status of conjectural 
explanations, not of empirically tested ones: in this sense, they are not 
acceptable as forms of scientific explanations, but only as als-ob general 
hypothesis about the social world which may well have a hermeneutic value or 
may even be trasformed into specified explanatory schemes for historical and 
social facts, enpirically falsifiable.
As a general model for the explanation of social life, I think that the 
invisible hand appears, at least, less implausible than social contract. Cn 
the one hand, as we have seen, it is more fundamental as a kind of 
explanation, cn the other, all our empirical evidence supports the view that 
patterns, rules, institutions can only with difficulty be conceived as the 
result of rational choice.
Besides that, as everybody knows, social contract presents a certain 
logical circularity; how can social rules be decided from pre-social 
condition? Normally, in the natural law tradition, some social content 
(some form of intersubjectivity), is already introduced in the state of 
nature (natural laws or laws of pure reason), in order to make collective 
agreement possible: very often, for example, the rule to keep promises is 
alieady assumed as working, even if not perfectly.
But coming to the normative strength of the two models, the situation 
is exactly the opposite. Ihe justification scheme of social arrangemets 
produced through a social pact is directly embodied in the very idea of 
collective agreement of rational individuals under specified circumstances. 
What better basis for political and moral obligations? And, in principle, 
which better path exists in order to overcome the gap between subjective 
values and interests,cn the one hand, and the need of common rules, on the 




























































































and principles? I do not want now to go into the difficulties which 
political philosophers must face in order to figure out how such an 
agreement may ever be reached, if different individuals, with different 
tastes, values and conflicting goals are assumed to be the starting point. 
Indeed the rich tradition of the natural law theories and the contemporary 
literature cn the axiomatic theory of rational choice give us several 
examples of the attempts to solve that problem, and everybody can judge 
whether they are satisfactory or not. Here I am concerned only with the 
very general normative idea implied in the social contract in the broadest 
possible sense, that is the idea of the public sphere of enforced obligation 
and commitment, as the result of a process starting from individuals 
collectively choosing their civil society, so that external legal 
constraints are also internally accepted. Therefore "eteronormy" is also 
reconciled with "autonomy". I believe this idea is the most powerful source 
of political obligation, since God's death in Western philosophy.
It is more difficult to assess the normative value of the invisible 
hand. In fact, the model gives a picture of the hypothetical development of 
social aggregates, which produces a spontaneous social order: here, some 
forms of social life are guaranteed, however, not necessarily the best or 
the most just or desirable from the viewpoint of individuals.
Hayek believes that the spontaneous outcome is justified through the 
analogy with natural selection. But leaving aside the legitimacy of the 
analogy itself, it should be pointed out that the apparent (a-posteriori) 
rationality of biological evolution is still quite far from the human 
standard of rationality. A heuristically fruitful distinction has been 
traced by Jon Elster, between local maximising rationality, characterizing 



























































































-  15  -
human capacities. The former is myopic, looking always for the first 
solution, while the latter makes wide use of strategic behaviour, such as 
the strategy used by Ulysses against the Sirenes, that of binding 
himself against the weakness of the will or that of "one step back for three 
forward later on"(17). Thus, we cannot regard natural selection as a 
satisfying way of solving problems concerning human aggregates. Moreover 
the agreement about human limitation in collective choice leaves us 
dissatisfied, once we have recognized a social problem. Quite the contrary, 
human beings have always tried to do something, maybe in the wrong direction 
or in an unefficient way, but they have not just waited for the invisible 
hand adjustments. Even in the case of natural catastrophes, we normally 
expect and require an organization for prevention and intervention 
afterwards.
Not by chance, I think, later followers of the invisible hand have 
assumed a coirpromising position towards social contract. Both Buchanan and 
Ivozick (18) have kept the invisible hand as an explanatory device for 
initial forms of rudimentary social life. In Buchanan's words, there is a 
more or less random initial distribution of goods. In Nozick's picture, 
there is an autonomous emergence of protective agencies, and then the 
selection of the most effective in a monopolistic position. This 
hypothetical social developments are spontaneously produced, but definitely, 
they are not conceived of as the best of all possible worlds. For a more 
stable framework to be worked out and a higher level of wants to be 
fulfilled some sort of social contract is required. Even if both Buchanan 
and Nozick are not concerned with distributive justice, still they introduce 



























































































-  16 -
property rights and individual freedom, which otherwise, in a purely 
invisible hand society, are always threatened by arbitrary outcomes.
Vfe can see that the result does not change in both cases: much as 
Hayek, Buchanan and Nozick support a liberal society where primary value is 
given to the individual's freedom and the private sphere's protection. But 
the procedure is quite different. I shall not engage here in a normative 
analysis of the value of freedom vs. distributive justice; my only concern 
is to point out the theoretical procedure implied in the two models.
An attempt to reconcile the invisible hand and the social contract may 
also have a positive effect on the latter.
Assuming that the social contract is signed within an already 
socialized framework, although spontaneously developed, the circularity of 
the contract itself is easily overcome. Language, mutual understanding, 
patterns and rules are supposed already existing, so that we can imagine a 
situation where a collective agreement can be reached .
The possibility of overcoming the theoretical difficulties involved in 
the social contract theory seems to me worth careful exploration. I-Iy point 
is, in fact, that the invisible haid is not a normative scheme, unless we 
allow for a clear case of naturalistic fallacy, based, after all, on the old 
concept of human nature. Cn the other side, the normative force of social 
contract appears strong. But we cannot avoid considering the fact that the 
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2.PORT'S OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND INDIVIDUALISM.
As mentioned before, individualism is included in models of political 
arrangements both as to the form of justification and in relation to the 
definition of the actors of politics, hence demanding of individuals' 
political participation. Of course, referring back to individuals may give 
rise to a wide range of different political justifications and obligations, 
according to whether individuals are considered as moral persons, natural 
beings, perfectly or partially informed, self-interested or benevolent and 
so on and so forth.
However individuals are considered, a major distinction can be traced 
between justifications founded on rational consent of free individuals and 
those referring to individuals' happiness and welfare as an end of the State 
which does not encompass individuals' positive involment in it.
Ln relation to this, a further possibility of inclusion of 
individualism within politics consists in that of a liberal order meant to 
protect and preserve individualism at the level of social life: this maybe 
called a case of 'passive political individualism'; but it is also 
historically the first way through vtfuch an individualist Weltanschauung has 
been expressed.
Considering the traditional form of political domination, as 
classically defined in Max Weber's typology(19), it does not provide room 
for individuals as such, in the political sphere. Reference to traditional 
values, rituals, principles vhose validity is rooted in their remote 




























































































Within this framework, political activity is by and large regulated by 
fixed roles, statutes, customs which are supposed to be protective of 
conmunity cohesiveness and which are deeply linked to religion and its 
organization.
The forms of traditional representation (Middle Ages' Parliament and 
assembly) were not channels for the individuals' participation in political 
process: indeed they were institutions with the symbolic significance of 
power' rituals and meant for the preservation of conmunity's integrity(20).
Of course this picture is only an ideal-type one which includes many 
historical varieties (with many exceptions) in one coherent model. 
Actually, as Weber himself stressed, within traditional power framework, 
there is a constant struggle between the aristocracy and the power holder, 
the king, who is concerned with the reinforcement of his own power and his 
individuality against the limits fixed by tradition, often preserved by 
clergy and aristocrats(21). But even in this case , individuals as such are 
neither the condition, the end, nor the actors of traditional system of 
politics.
Coming now, briefly, to another Weberian type of political power, the 
charismatic authority is that emamating from the inherent exceptional 
qualities of a leader, with uncommon gift of persuasion over people(22). In 
this case the only individual, the only free agent is the leader with his 
innovating and creative force. Opposite him, the others are only followers.
By contrast, the third kind of political authority, within Weberian 
typology, the legal rational, corresponds to various forms 
of mo d e m  and contemporary state, where individualism is entailed.
The best example of reconciliation between individualism and political 



























































































-  19 -
grounded cn the collective consent to established rules and procedures; room 
for public discussion and confrontation is part of the game; more or less 
enlarged participaticn is guaranteed.
The result may not be particularly original: that liberalism is 
individualistic in its core is a sort of truism. But what I want to stress 
is that only political arrangements which allow some form of rational 
control and participation leave room for political individualism. Ihis is 
also to say that, following this perspective, the mechanism of power and 
organization demands "trasparence" from the point of view of the public. In 
order to have justification of political arrangements supported by rational 
individuals, a knowledge of political process and possible alternatives is 
required, and for the participation to be guaranteed, the mechanism should 
be open and accessible. Mistery, esoterism, magic rituals, in other words, 
the 'sacred' is ruled out of rational legal power where individuals have 
access to the rules and to the decision-making procedures(23).
While with the breaking down of the Ancien Regime, the visibility of 
political power has disappeared in the anonimity of popular sovreignity(24), 
the mechanism of rules, procedures, policy discussing and decision making 
has emerged in the sight of the public from the darkness of traditional 
rules and the absolute will of Kings.
In relation to the suggested dynamics between visibility/invisibility, 
light/barkness, an the one hand, and individuals' involvment in politics, on 
the other, I would like to point out two special (mixed) cases of political 
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In the version provided by Hayek, the former has already been analyzed 
in the first paragraphs. Now, I believe that the invisible hand mechanism 
can be said to be politically individualist only as to the form of 
justification, because the overall order is meant as the defence of 
individual economic freedom, but in a very weak sense of the expression.
In the classical representation of the invisible hand (from Bernard de 
Mandeville to Hayek), individuals are not involved (or not necessarily) in 
the political process; they are only left free by it to pursue their own 
plans. Ihe political system itself is something outside rational control 
('invisible'), allowing for little room for participation and collective 
decision. Yet the process is beneficial to individuals' interest and 
constitutes the best way to preserve their private freedom, but, as I have 
said, it does so unintentionally, as a secondary effect. Indeed, in such a 
model, all choices, goals, values and means are defined by the individual 
engaged in market transactions, and very little room is left to politics, as 
a specific dimension of social life.
Thus, in the case of invisible hand, individuals are enlightened, but 
only in a very limited way, only about themselves and, on the other side, in 
the dark about the conpositional process producing the political order, so 
that they cannot do anything to regulate politics, except to trust in its 
beneficial development.
The picture looks quite the opposite in the case of enlightened 
despotism. First of all, a methodological remark: "enlightened despotism" 
is an expression used by the German historiography of the late XIX century 



























































































-  21 -
influenced by enligbtement philosophy during XVIII century. Because of the 
origin of the expression, many scholars have put in question whether 
enligjitned despotism has ever existed, either as a political formation or as 
a specific doctrine(25). Here I do not intend to answer this question, but I 
can only to suggest that the idea of the absolute king inspired by the light 
of reason and by philosophers was definitely part of the common sense of the 
lumières and, for a while, an actual hope of the Encyclopédie cire le, shared 
by Voltaire, d'Alambert, and Diderot. Furthermore, the governments of 
several absolute European states (Russia, Austria, Prussia) were consciously 
inspired by this general idea, which sometimes was structured in a proper 
political programne of enlightened reforms(26). Eventually, a theoretical 
sketch of such a state was coherently developed in the work of the economic 
school called the Fhysiocratie. All in all, I think that enough elements 
are available to outline the model of enlightened despotism(27).
Here a clear separation obtains between the greater part of the 
population (living in the "dark") and the happy few, enlightened by 
knowledge and reason. In this situation, les savantes have the moral duty 
of advising the holder of the absolute power, who, in his/her turn cannot 
but follow reason, both as logical and moral inperatives, and cannot but 
rule in the truest interest of ignorant individuals. The justification of 
this political model is thus the individuals' happiness and welfare, and the 
achievement of it, is indeed the goal of politics (and not, as in the 
previous case, just a by-product ) : but individuals are not active subjects 
of the programme. Their rational and free consent is not required; on the 
contrary, from the very logic of the knowledge's unequal distribution, they 
cannot but be the objects of a design encompassing them . But through the 




























































































they will get to understand and appreciate that this arrangement is exactly 
for their best. Under the rule of such a government, individuals are 
clearly not free; so far this is not only as political actors, but also as 
regards social life, which is organized and regulated by the centralized 
state, with the exception of economic business, expecially free trade, which 
is, for instance, strongly advocated by Physiocratic school. Here in spite 
of the resemblance of the Platonic model of philosopher kings, utilitarian 
considerations are actually the leading motives: the goal of general 
happiness, being materially defined, has an unambiguous distributive 
connotation. So it is not a "corrmon good" in the holistic sense, but the 
sum of individual utilities. But what we can correctly call a 
definitionally individualistic goal, is attained here through a tremendous 
enlargement of the political sphere, from which real individuals are totally 
excluded.
Despite the immediately striking diffeences between the liberal 
invisible hand model and this authoritarian programme, some similarities may 
be poited out. Both models assume human ignorance: in the case of invisible 
hand, ignorance, or limited knowledge is an ontological character of human 
nature, so that virtually nobocty can escape . Cn this basis freedom is 
granted; nobody knows the best, everybody should be left free to try. Hayek 
states very clearly that if human beings were omniscient, there would not be 
a case for freedom(28).
On the other hand, enlightened despotism views ignorance, widely 
spread through out society as a historical product of superstition, 
religious, beliefs and so on. Accordingly, the intellectuals through a 
systematic practice of reasoning, are able to move towards the truth, 
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power holders can be assured, then this will be the most effective method to 
struggle against superstition and to 'spread enlightment, because in a 
traditional society absolute power is believed to be necessary to implement 
these policies quickly and efficiently.
Vhat I want to stress is that the liberalism inplied in the invisible 
hand, depends only cn a different description of the character of human 
ignorance, and not cn a different normative position(29). So, if a 
supporter of enlightened despotism could give conclusive evidence about the 
distribution of ignorance and knowledge, according to Enlistment's point of 
view, the invisible hand supporter should be consistently convinced of the 
preferability of the other arrangement. In my opinion, this hypothesis 
shows that when individualism is limited to the social economic life, built 
on a very strong negative concept of liberty, it is always open to the 
terrptation of benevolent omniscient dictator.
Indeed, no value is attached to individual rational consent to 
politics, to the capability of collective control of the process and to an 
active participation. Accordingly, when the possibility of an enligjitned 
leadership is given, no normative barrier of principle prevents the 
invisible-hand-libertarian from adopting such an authoritarian arrangement, 
as far as economic freedom is kept. This very fact can explain why such 
"negative" liberalism is often tempted by very conservative position on 
civil rights; the reason being that freedom is not an ultimate value, but a 
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3. INDIVIDUALISM AT© THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
In the second paragraph, I have briefly shown which models of political 
order entail individualism, and in which sense of individualism. Now I 
would like to view the other side of the issue, that is , how individualism 
may shape political arrangements.
In the first paragraph the analysis was focussed on the application of 
methodological individualist to political theory: the presentation started 
with methodological questions and then went into the specific problem of the 
usages within the field of political philosophy. Here, again, I would like 
to look at the other side of the problem. Ihat is, first I will select the 
specific points that an individualistic We 1 tanschauung raises in the area of 
politics and, then, I v/ill try to see whether there is a solution consistent 
with an individualistic method.
A very general and provisional definition of an individualistic 
We I tansc hauung in relation to politics may be expressed as follows. 
Political organizations should be sketched in such a way that they serve 
individuals (however defined) because there is nothing above or behind them: 
individuals are indeed the only actors in the social world(30). Of course 
the picture will vary depending on whether the individual is defined as an 
autonomous being, or as oriented towards self-development or as valuable 
because of the intrinsic dignity of human life, or as a subject of rights, 




























































































I would like to show that a conmon feature of all these 
"indivi dual isms" affecting the political dimension is the emergence of the 
"public good" or "general interest" as a problem.
In a "holistic" society, that is a society where individuals' existence^' 
is conceived as dependent on the whole, the political subject is thè 
community as such and the collective goals Which are postulated as the ends' 
of political activity are supposed to be inclusive, fcy definition, of 
individual interests.
This is because individual interests cannot be imagined as glveft, 
independently from the conmon good and so conflicting with it unless in’the1' 
case of behaviour deviating from the standard of the good citizen. 
Therefore, individual interests, considerations of private utility,' selfish 
behaviour are not simply ignored and denied in their existence, rather they 
are excluded from the definition of common good and of justice. They are ‘ 
kinds of moral behaviour worthless of citizenship.
A classical example of this position can be found in Cicero's De" 
Officiis(31 ). In his analysis, he defined the morally good as that kind of " 
behavior which necessarily includes considerations of others and of thè*‘ 
community as a whole, so that the result of pursuing the morally good will 
lead consistently to the prosperity of the community (rei pubblicae salus or 
bene communis).
(Clearly, one of Cicero's major concern is the safety of the Roman 
homeland against external enemies which would mean not only the loss of" 
group-identity, in terms of dignity and pride, but also of personal freedom
V , . . ' ' : . •as a consequence of the end of Rome's liberty as political entity. This real 
threat may well explain how it is inpossible in such a situation to conceive 
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At the same time, according to Cicero, no conflict can actually arise 
between the morally good and the consideration of personal interest 
(utilitas). The morally good is indeed the only good and what is on the
opposite scale has scarcely the slightest weight, so that such a conflict 
can never arise (Book, III- 111,11). All the wrongful gains stemming from 
the quest for personal profit (and so from a misinterpretation of individual 
interest) are against the law of nature, of nations, of god, and of men 
(Book III, V,21-24). Ihe metaphor Cicero used in order to single out the 
wrongfulness of such behavior, sharply presents the contradiction between 
self-seeking and the very nature of human society:
"Suppose by way of conpariscn, that each one of our bodily members 
should conceive this that it could be strong and well if it should draw off 
to itself the health and the strenght of its neighbouring members, the whole
■ 4 . {
body would necessarily be enfeebled and die"(Book III, V, 22).
Revisiting Menenius Agrippa's popular apologus, Cicero grounds it in 
the law of nature which, binding all the individuals in the same mankind, 
imposes mutual obligations on each members for the community and the human 
mankind to be saved. I
I shall now give another example of a holistic point of view on general 
interest, even though this example may be very different theoretically and 
distant historically, namely Hegel's ethical state.
In Cicero's time, as we have seen, political individualism was quite 
inpossible to conceive; indeed, Cicero's respublica represents a conmon
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Hegelian philosophy stemmed from an age of triumphant individualism and 
his efforts were actually oriented towards a full criticism of what he 
considered the one-sideness of individualism itself. Without here 
attempting the suimary of Hegelian philosophy, I would like to refer to some 
passages in his Fhilosophy of Rights, which relate to the topic of the 
common good. Hegel states the existence of a superior point bridging the 
gap between individuals and an atomistic society. Ihe state indeed 
represents a universal position, expressing the rational necessity of 
dialectical development. Because of its intrinsic rationality, it cannot be 
the outcome of a social contract, given the inherent contingency implied in 
the very idea of the contract. It cannot be an optional possibility either, 
meant to secure individuals' protection, as exemplified by the nightwatchman 
state of the liberals. Rather, the state constitutes the condition for 
ethical life, because the universal is embedded in it and ethics cannot 
stemm from particularities (32).
Thus the state will is not general, does not proceed from the 
individuals'arbitrary will, but rather is universal, i.e., embodying the 
objective rationality of the Spirit, whether recognized or not by 
individuals. So "this final end has a supreme right against the individual 
whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state"(33).
Hegel's idealism can be considered as an atteript to overcome the 
difficulty of an individualistic definition of public interest, by means of 
the assumption of an entirely different point of view, that of the 
'universal' encompassing all the historical and empirical singularities 
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The individualistic and the holistic viewpoints differ in relation to 
politics not because the former assumes society as composed of individuals; 
indeed this is true also for the latter. Rather the difference lies in the 
fact that holism attributes a specific perspective to the whole, defined as 
the objective rationality or whatever, from where a view unfettered by 
individual limits is granted. For this reason human beings should
subordinate their plans and interests. Cn the other side, social goals, 
values and principles are alleged to be embodied only in individuals. So
the condition and the scope for political enterprise are based on (various). V f ■;{? Li. ■ L
individual motives and purposes.
This implies that the public interest is neither given nor evident, nor 
is it the starting assumption, but its definition must derive from 
individual interests or preferences.
Taking as an example the tradition of natural law theories,
individuals are assumed to have existence before civil society as
• ' " T: r
independent beings. Whether this assumption was supposed to be realistic or 
not, what matters most is the method. In order to define the core and the 
scope of civil society (and until Rousseau, the term 'civil society' was
* r- 'v'i ; : ',‘j
used as a syncnymous of political association)(34), a preceding definition
* ’ ' ! ■/. t. ( Ji ...
of individual in isolation was required through which the social order could 
be obtained. Given the methodological character, the definition of the 
individual cannot but be abstract(35). In this abstract notion, human 
beings more than individuals emerge, in the sense that features of human 
nature more than the unique qualities of the single are pointed out. 
(Nevertheless the individuality of such an abstract being is given in a)the 
supposition of his/her independency from any social context; b) the 




























































































individualisn irrplied in natural law has been seen as the secularization of 
God in human beings, now conceived as self-sufficient, purposive, rational 
actors). But what matters more now is that each individual is a unit of the 
social life and that the latter will correspond to the organization of the 
single units in a complex order, according to various procedures.
Since the various definitions of the public sphere must take 
individuals into account, it will follow consistently that the differences 
in anthropological conceptions will play a significant role together with 
the rules of conposition, so to speak, i.e., the procedures of aggregation.
From the extensive literatture and the several schools of thought on 
this subject, I would like to recall three different possible solutions 
which embody relevant traditions in political thought.
I will not insist too much on the first, which has already been 
examined, i.e., the invisible hand model. In this case harmony between 
individual and public interest is already postulated: private vices become 
public virtues. Here, self-interested, irrperfectly informed, only partially 
rational, mainly economic men require the limitation of political dimension 
for the sake of spontaneous development of social forces, which, 
fortunately, produces beneficial effects.
In passing, I will recall that contemporary game theory has pointed out 
some cases, such as the widely known "prisoner dilenma", where individual 
self-interested rationality produces a sub-optimal collective result. 
Moreover, Mancur Olson, in the Logic of Collective Action(36), has shown 
many exanrples of collective disruption following from a purely individual 
rationality: situations like the prisoner dilemma and cases of "free rider"




























































































serious difficulties in the conception of the natural harmony between public
' ' w  ' <*U .. / l:rl
and private interests.
'iT>,
ri; S a  flM
— * L- :  
The second solution I would like to recall is that of utilitarianism.
■" ■ *" * 1  *i &  " ■ f  \ P
With the invisible hand mechanism, this second viewpoint shares a
• ' ' • • 5 . s» :■ * •"""" A'1! i',
naturalistic model of human nature, but, on the other hand, it does not
include any stress on human limitation. Seeking pleasure and avoiding pain
■' .:h ■ • ,-7 - <v,
are at the core of human motives for action and indeed they are also the■?; h ' • ..• • '• • • ■ *' - V • :• • -V.*»- • >$ J \f
only criterion for ethical behaviour, there being nothing beyond pain and 
pleasure in humane nature. Cn the basis of such a hedonistic anthropology, 
the ethical problem arises when there are interferences and conflicts 
am eng private utilities. Thus, a socio-political arrangement is morally
good when it represents the sum of individual utilities. The resultant
’ : ' - ■ • a* ' ' ' ' ■ vti * ». .v
publip interest is nothing more and/or different than the aggregate of
.trr • «;•*/. yfbrr
private preferences/37). Of course, this simple definition is not itself a
* ‘ .» f ’.■*;> • ••* >v. f v * l  .. e f
* ■' ■ ••• - * ft*-*
solution, because the very problem is how to define the corrpositional rule
r  :i'2 ■ M r ~ i \  . I f t T S t  i - 7 . r ;
for a function of social "utility". Here I do not wish to examine the
variety of utilitarian literature about this point, but I want to recall
„• . '' '... '/ ■ „’!■■■■■&*■■>• .• -s»* f%.. ... V  ■ *.:.£ # -,r,f
that Bentham's suggestion on the composition of individuals' utilities was
merely axiomatic (the happiness of the greatest number). He presupposed
' . ' t  '  * •• v t  „--v. ••*<'»■ 1 iT .tr1
that .each individual, making the felicific calculus cn a societal scale,
■
would have assumed the viewpoint of the whole, considering the whole itself
- a ,aft.*. . .. ..............  ~  • . . .  »  . .  ... -  ^  -  jr • ■•**■.‘4  »
as an individual. The.obvious implication is that the so obtained public
. ■ ■ U ■ o ipwa
interest does not reflect all individual interests, some of which are simply 




























































































Thus a strictly individualistic starting point ends up with a social 
utility where the only individual is society as such, defined as a sum­
ranking, where individuals have disappeared in the total lunp. Even if, 
utilitarianism, since Bentham has grown iirpressively both in moral 
philosophy and in economics, it still has offered no satisfactory answer to 
the problem of harmonizing personal preferences in a social function vhich 
fully reflect individuals' utility.
The last solution to the problem of public interest I am going to 
consider now, refers back to the Kantian ethics(39). Kant views human being 
as belonging both to the realm of sensitivity and to that of reason. But 
while as a member of the former, he/she is only a passive eteronomous 
natural being, as a member of the latter he/she is active and autonomous. As 
far he/she is autonomous rational being, he/she is also creative and free. 
Given the priority of the world of reason over the other, human beings 
should recognize themselves as subject to the purely law of reason which is 
also their autonomous will. So, realizing their freedom, at the same time 
individuals realize morality, which follows from autonomy and liberty . The 
link between morality, autonomy and liberty is explained as follows: if 
human being, instead, pursued private utility, then they would not be 
autonomous actors, since they would become dependent on the eteronomous 
commands of nature and sensitivity. Thus, utilitarian behavior cannot be 
free, self-imposed, but always externally determined. .
Now, Kant considers politics as the sphere where moral persons enter 
into reciprocal relationships to set up a civitas by public law where




























































































Thus, clearly, the definition.;.r of the public space is affected by 
individuals, but not insofar as they merely bear private interest and 
utility. Rather, because of human autonomy and freedom, each individual 
should be considered as an end in hfm-rherself and never as a means, or an 
object for the others' desire, nor for the general happiness. Ibis irrplies 
that as far as the definition of the public good is concerned, individuals
' -i i '? :i  '
count as moral persons, freely acting according to the universal law 
(following the criterion if univeralizability, in Hare's language), not just 
as utility's Trager.
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant maintains openly that the core of 
the political state cannot mean private citizen's welfare or happiness:
these goals are indeed easily obtained even in the state of nature” •' •* *'“■ ■ ■ \
(according to Rousseau) or, even, under a despotic rule(40).
Rather,., the political state, envisaged ty his theory is .a legal 
constitution vbich is meant to preserve freedom and which citizens have a 
moral duty to obey through their own pure reason.
ho ...There fore, in the Kantian approach, the gap-between individual tastes 
and • preferences and the public good is filled by morality. Achieving the 
status of moral person, individuals should regard.their interests merely as 
subordinated to their sensitive nature and to be dismissed vis-à-vis the*. 'v y. j
moral inperatives of reason. According to reason's maxims, individuals- '“ft'-'
should give their actions a universal form. In this way, moral persons get■ ■ \/s
to a level vbich is shared by all rational beings, leaving aside the 
enpirical differences of natural individuals. In the kantian perspective, 
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Concluding this section on public interest, the three examples I havë'
YJ («P. II» i OtHT: X Igiven share the view that the public should be' deduced and/or pr 
from/by individuals. From this very general point; vshich can b e "called
I;-'’-'','; . v . ■! i • , . .,■» .
individualistic versus holistic, various theory are built according to the
! -â
surrounding conditions, namely the kind of human nature (naturalistic or
autonomously connotated) and its capabilities of knowledge, and the
$**' *•- VrJ CS'J&dC. : rt ! *. U ’<
"conpositional rules". ,j ; } .’VO
:. .
The first solution is indeed a way to ignore the problem, postulating :a
' ‘ •• * * •' ; '.... *,.. , ' .. ■ .f -. . ' h  \ ç .#•** ; ; ; : • ...
questionable harmcny betweeen individuals and the public sphere. At the
ec "-..cc-r. :.s ur..cvhi'u hv,,' a.i ■ ■„ , ï ,.y .<■ ■ . ,
same time, individuals in themselves, however "they be, apparently are rfitr
- hlUXb ." r - . - c - .. : .constrained by the overall order. In my opinion the lack (or minimization)'
b *  Xli i  ' C '"'ifi’l  h> f k i .V .  r g j  ry* r  C ■ * - L P ï îO —of public constraints on individuals is cnly apparent: it derives from'the*
fact that the theory of the invisible hand does not provicie any suggestion
for the overall order to be designed, but stresses, on the contrary, its
spontaneous character.
■ «** ~ -■ • : 7». , c; M.5 ;
or.-
~ , ■ .ei . • r filt '• r')’ <•-,,{ -.-i'v». -- iBut the spontaneity in itself does not guarantee that the emerging
'■7 ' ■ - f :'C ardîti'. e; ;«•<**; at? b-c; , ■ .■*,?tfcr-viaorder wrill not constrain the individual's plans and will. Thus, thé' method
iii a i a v . I i i î t  Çi&AlfiU i* y ;C r  . •; - ^  t   v i r a  v ."  -  ,inplied in the invisible hand is strictly individualistic and ho général1 'dr
S'* * Âv * i:!social viewpoint is alreaciy assumed to figure' out 'the (desirable) common
■••sc.: r
good, but the (question is not anwered in "itself'. ''Ah individualistic
. .u . 1. ", • - J V ‘ . ' f i .  £i?‘. r j p '
procedure does not necessarily bring about a public interest which
It* ' 1 • j. , . - . . ... •
be
satisfactory from the individual components' viewpoint. •'.71 *7) ̂
!■ \r 'I '*'• ' ,' ( _
The other twe exanples, in a very different way, produce'a definition
of the public interest that in both cases implies the' assumption of some
'r: :fCl̂ " ■ n.u.f ? >m  n  M  bo - - D , - ...super-individual viewpoint.
In the case of utilitarianism, we have the individual, who, when1 scscial 




























































































societal basis. That is, he/she first puts him-herself in the place of the; / . * - vv • $ • ■ . ,
whole, and, second, considers the "whole's perpective" as that of an 
individual, so that as a result the single would maximize whole' s 
preferences as if the whole were him-herself.
Kant, cn the other side, making the distinction between sensitivity and 
reason in human nature, stresses the rational sphere as a superior point
overcoming utility's consideration and as a m i  versai character, bridging
particularities. In themselves, human beings find the conditions of
possibility of the public sphere, defined in its turn as the condition for
• P
freedom of all. The only requirement is that individuals cannot be
*>. > J .v  ' • ...■ ■< . t  . w;1
considered in their irrmediate enpirical appareance, but should be assumed as
■ ' ' ■’ • * ■ -,r t. i • >- i o
moral persons able to set up such a free constitution.
f
. -.' • ■ ? ’ •. ■ "■ •,* - •* *' 1 '- - * w
The picture of the problem has necessarily been very sketchy, but,
picking up examples from different influential traditions, at least, shows
* ■ ‘ .f>
alternative basic procedures used to define the subject, starting from the
same very general point. The result of this preliminary analysis is that
none of the models examined is conclusive. Should we conclude that we must
give up an individualist approach to the definition of the public 
interest ( 41 ) ? Is this a case of clear-cut alternative between a dismissal
of the problem tout-court (invisible hand) or some form of holistic
assumption of what the public interest is?
Given the present purpose of this paper (i.e., the pointing out
theoretical problems) and its character of work in progress, I will not try




























































































Rather, as a provisional conclusion, I would like to stress the fact 
that the general definition of 'individualism' is not enough to characterize 
a political theory. Many other surrounding conditions must be specified in 
order to catch the methodological procedures, the basic Weltanschauung 
implied and the political arrangement proposed as the outcome. A  theory 
need not necessarily be said "individualist" in all of the three aspects, 
even if there is more than a casual connection among the three.
Yet the connotation of individualism, that is the assumption 
ofindividualistic perspective at some level, rules out immediately the 
possibility that the theory under consideration may support for example 
totalitarianism or fascist regimes. Thus, "individualism" gives a negative 
connotation to a political theory, more than a positive picture of the 
political model 'necessarily' implied in it.
For these reasons, here I have tried to reconstruct possible paths 
linking individualism to some strategies of political inquiry; the analysis 
has shown that the sharp opposition between individualism and holism is much 
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8. See, in this respect, J.Buchanan "Is Economics a Pure Science of 
Choice?", in Road to Freedom, essays in honour of F.Hayek, London 1969.
9. About Hayek's methodological position, the main references are to his
Individualign and Economic Order,. London... 1943 and The Counter­
revolution of Science-, Glencoe ,„I11 ;, 1952. ( especially "THe Facts ot
Social Sciences"). •gsSR-à
- .. ZI . - ; «C V ' .. W* m  ;
10. See Hayek "Economies and Knowledge' in Individualism and Economie
Order, quoted, and "Ihe Use of -Knowledge -in Society"., ibidem.. ,.,,v
• • •• -rx::.‘'.etc - -a • . t
11. H.Simon, Administrâtive Behaviour, • NewTYork 1960.
12. F.Hayek, Individual ism:,True and False, Dublin 1944. ...
13. See my paper "Individualism in Carl, Wenger's Methodology of Social
Science", mimeo, Cambrigde 1982. - - ' ', ,T ** ^ •-
14. About the 1 a-posteriori1 ’ rationality of natural evolution see J.Élster, 
Ulisses and the Syrenes, -Camridge 1979, pp.3-i8.
15. R.Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia, quoted, p.19.
15. C.Mengeh, Principles of Economics, Glencoe, Ill.,i950, pp.169-
180;p.230;pp.260 foil.; Id., Problems of Economics and Society,-Urbana,
111., 1963, book.Ill "The Origin of Money",ppl52 foil. A critique of
the quasi-natural evoution from barter to money as the typical exanple 
of the invisible hand mechanism can be found in H.Sheiner "Can a ’Social 
Contract Be Signed by an Invisible Hand?" in Bimaum et al. eds., 
Democracy, Consensus and Social Contract, London 1978.




J.Buchanan, The limits of Liberty, Chicago 1975; R.Nozick, Anarchy, 
State and Utopia,quoted.
” , «, * V r' ■■■'"M.Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tubingen, 1976(3), pp.124.
- 1  : f  ! y  :  9 .
A.H.Birch, Representation, London,1971,pp.22-25.’*"
21. See also R.Bendix, King or People,Power and The .Mandate to Rule, 
Berkley 1978.
22. See. M.Weber, quoted, pp.130, foil.
23. About the divorce between political process, and the "sacred", after the 
French Revolution, examined through spatial metaphors, see J.Laponce, 
Left and Right: A topography of Political Perception, Toronto-Buffalo- 
New-York,1981.
, ., ' , f % ■ - . " V / ' « ■ 2
24 Although he rrakes use of “a different theoretical approach, also 
M. Foucault in his Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris 
1975, states that the' typical feature of contemporary form of power is 




























































































T  core of Ancien Regime typically esemplified by Louis XVI, and 
correspondently by the public spectacle of punishments, see chap.II.
25. L.Krieger, An Essay on the Theory of Enlightened Despotism, London - 
Chicago 1975.
-jij- . ' -, : ‘
26/ See also rry Istituzioni educative e politica della cultura; La Riforma 
dell'Università1 di Pavia (1754-1781), Pavia 1978.
27. K.Bazzoli, La cultura politica dell'assolutismo illuminato, forthcoming 
(Franco Angeli).
28. F.Hayek, The Costitution of Liberty, London and Chicago 1960, p.29.
29. A wider discussion on Hayek's concept of liberty as a procedural value
can be found in my "Uno schema di giustificazione della società' 
liberale", Problemi della Transizione, 14, 1984, p.141. Other
criticisms of the ambiguity of freedom as a value in Hayek's view can 
be found in M.H.Wilhem, "Political Thought of F.A.Hayek" in Political 
Studies, XX, p.168 foil.; W.G.Watkins "Philosophy' in Agenda for a Free 
Society (Seldcn ed.), London 1961, p.47; H.B.Actcn, "Objectives",
ibidem, p.75.
30. L.Dumont, in his recent Essay sur 1 'individualism, Paris 1983, has 
studied the development from holistic societies to individualistic 
ones.
31. I am referring to the English edition of the text, translated by 
W.Miller, Harvard-London 1913.
32. G.W.F.Hegel, Fhilosophy of Right, English tranl.by T.M.Knox, Oxford 
1952, see III part "Ethical life: The State", pp_155-160.
33. Ivi, p.156.
34. M.Bovero, "Il modello hegelo-marxiano" in N.Bobbio-M.Bovero, Stato e 
società' nella filosofia politica moderna, Milano 1979 pp.140-146.
35. In this respect I do not share the marxist criticism of the abstract 
individual as an ideological approach to the study of the society 
(robinsonades). See Marx, Introduction to the Critique of Political 
Econony (1857), in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
Chicago 1913, pp.226-228. See also S.Lukes, Individualism, Oxford 
1973, pp.75-78. Indeed, since the 'abstract individual' is a 
methodological fiction, Marx's criticism, i.e., that it hypostatizes a 
historical model of man in general feature of humane nature, is clearly 
a case of ontological fallacy. It may well turn out that the abstract 
individual is not an adequate tool to describe, say, holistic 
societies, but,even then, this inadequacy does not question its 
legitimacy as a metodological approach to social reality.
36. Cambridge Mass.1965.
Among the large amount of utilitarian literature, a good suimary of the 





























































































design of the social happiness is the recent Beyond Utilitarianism 
edited by A.Sen and B.Williams, Cambridge 1982. A good presentation of 
the public choice literature is P.Martelli, La logica della scelta 
collettiva, Milano 1983.
38. J.Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of morals and legislation, 
in A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of 
Moral Legislation, VAHarrison, ed., Oxford 1948, p.125.
39. I.Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, in Kant's Political Writings, H.Reiss
ed., Cambridge 1971, pp.131-175.
40. Ibidem, p.142.
41. This is indeed the position nrainiained by F.Cppenheim, in the definition 
of 'Public Interest" where he argues that for the very logic of the two 
concepts 'public' and 'interest' ( which, according to him, always 
connotes something related to material welfare), the definition of the 
expression cannot be "definitionally individualistic", but necessarily
- it should refer to the whole as such. See F.Cppenheim, Political 




























































































1 - ■: .i- ddx > !
PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
EUI WORKING PAPERS
Publications of the European university institute' ,i - r :• - jùiy 1984
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries
2: Joseph H.H. WEILER Supranational ism Revisited - 
Retrospective and Prospective. The 
European Communities After Thirty 
Years
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates “ •A ‘ * •<-
4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/ 
David GOLAY
Judicial Review, Transnational and 
Federal: Impact on Integration
5: Léonard GLESKE The European Monetary System: Present 
Situation and Future ProspectsF v „ ’ f.v
6: Manfred HINZ Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der 
national-soziali stischen Architektur
7: Wilhelm BURKLIN The "Greens" and the "New Politics": 
Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
•: . 1 ',r • 'uM.-. .
8: Athanasios MOULAKIS Unilateralism or the Shadow of 
Confusion ' 1 I 1 1 V- 'J
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy of 
an Abstraction v •
10 :Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics; .'■ <" M r*. ••• ; t.c-u;
11:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI A Neo-Cambridge Model of Income 
Distribution and Unemployment
X2:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI/ On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
Guglielmo CHIODI • ■ AC ■•A, - ~ *
13:Gunther TEUBNER 
14:Gunther TEUBNER
Reflexive Rationalitaet des RechtsL V •; ■* Vf.-j \ . . v; - ; .





























































































PUBLICAT IONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY- INSTITUTE,; , r^V;, î'
15:Jens ALBER Some Causes and Consequences of Social 










■" ■ JJDemocratic Party Government: Formation 
and Functioning in Twenty-One 
Countries . •#,. . .
Parties and Political Mobilization: An 
•Initial Mapping _ -
Party Government and Democratic 





, • _   ̂ • 3 fci ..i i , j  *_ .  •)1 . . *Decision Process and. Policy Outcome:' ■ • )** V V K' l.An Attempt to Conceptualize the 
Problem at the Cross-National Level
’ ■ • ► »*'•  5 l i  f ?)  v  :  ,
The Emergence of Welfare Classes in 
West Germany: Theoretical. Perspectives
• " 4 _  . _ _  j- *•- i X i i o f f l  Oand empirical Evidence
22 : Don PATINKIN , -
"*’n*.. -,
23: Marce Ho DE CECCO
’ •; ; -, .'V ‘ ?
24:Marcello DE CECCO 
25:Manfred E. STREIT
26:Domenico Mario NUTI
• - : . ■ . ' j fuj ' r i27:Terence C. DAINTITH




Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory►7.1 . ' ~7i , , :!l I s  f, f r: , ■
Inflation and Structural Change in the 
- Euro-Dollar .Market , > , .
The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in
the '20s and the !-70s « .- 0S7S JhSM g
... f -  . » -
,► Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of
Analytical. Inquiry _ ■ Cl
*-* -Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe -
Prospects and Repercussions . ... » x ■ U*;
. ' ULegal Analysis of Economic Policy
■ i î .. \  :,i V. v . t  T -■ , ,. . V jLeft-Right Poli4jrî aL S£.â esf:, ̂Some 
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